The Domestic Approach to National Intelligence

The Domestic Approach to National Intelligence

Within the national Intelligence Community what are the primary legal restrictions to comprehensive integration? For example, can federal law enforcement share criminal information with the DoD?

Within the national Intelligence Community what are the primary legal restrictions to comprehensive integration? For example, can federal law enforcement share criminal information with the DoD? Use outside sources in developing your response.

The Intelligence Community engages with federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners within the United States. The overarching goal is to strengthen the national security such that citizens are protected, their privacy is maintained, and their civil rights and liberties are not infringed upon. Elements of the IC interact with the FSLTT (Federal, State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial) partners to share elements of criminal intelligence, homeland security, investigative, cyber threat, and suspicious information. These and other elements of information are shared with national IC elements. Information flows in the other direction sharing national foreign, and counter intelligence with FSLTT in a limited and tightly regulated manner. In each case the information from one entity is shared to assist with responsibilities and specific mission requirements. The Intelligence community works on a global scale with as subset of their effort comprising a domestic emphasis. Outputs from the FSLTT entities interact with the domestic side of the IC.

Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2016). Domestic Approach to National Intelligence.

Taylor, R. W., & Russell, A. L. (2012). The failure of police ‘fusion’centers and the concept of a national intelligence sharing plan. Police Practice and Research13(2), 184-200.

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One lawful limitation to the far-reaching reconciliation of national intelligence organizations is the issue and approval of security clearances. The confined and state policing units are the eyes and ears paying special attention to public threats and extremists, giving significant insight into the federal administrative law and insight into organizations with the local authority, they won’t get insight consequently. The justification behind this is that they come up short on trusted status for admittance to this Intel data and the clearance process is time-consuming and requires critical assets not only in time but in a budget as well. A portion of these legitimate limitations has been defeated through the execution of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, which began after 9/11, which was to give a component to further developed cooperation and incorporation between intelligence agencies and local enforcement representatives. Nonetheless, the sharing of insight relies upon the strategies of the organization inside the IC, the security of the bureau, and the mentality of the particular bureau toward insight sharing. Likewise, inconsequential to legitimate limitations, the Intel Community culture has a long history of categorization of data, controlled data sharing, and works on a “Need To Know” premise. Another limitation to extensive incorporation of the national intelligence agencies area and their activities is the reality they are represented by various regulations and are under various responsibility and order structures. For example, Central Intelligence Agency clandestine tasks require an official finding, and afterward, that discovery is given to choose councils of Congress. A similar activity led by the military can be helped out by orders given through their hierarchy of leadership, the President, and doesn’t need an official finding.

The 1974 Hughes-Ryan alteration was the administrative system, which initially had command over clandestine activities, which rejects, “the consumption of any assets by any United States government organization for obscured activity tasks except if the President ”found” that the tasks were in the public safety interest of the U. S. and presented in a writing to the Congress.

At the end of the day, it’s all about agencies’ policies and expectations. “These ‘shared expectations’ are the rules of the game consented to by both the players and the spectators of the game, though in importantly different ways. Consonant with the rules, both teams may attempt to deceive each other even though this is clearly using the other as a means” (Pfaff and Tiel, 2006). Duplicities, nonetheless, sabotage this sort of trust and hence can’t be important for the common assumptions for individuals who have such networks. Misdirecting them isn’t admissible and in this manner ought to typically be stayed away from.

Reference

Pfaff, T. and Tiel, j., 2006. Shibboleth Authentication Request. [online] Www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy1.apus.edu. Available at: <https://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/doi/full/10.1080/15027570310004447> [Accessed 7 June 2022].

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